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1507 
COMMENTS 
 
PRESIDENTIAL INACTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS 
FOR EXECUTIVE NONENFORCEMENT DISCRETION 
Daniel Stepanicich∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The growth of the administrative state and political gridlock in 
Congress has made presidential control over national policymaking a 
defining feature of contemporary American politics.  In contrast to 
foreign policy and national defense, where the Constitution clearly 
establishes the President as the Commander in Chief, the Constitu-
tion only explicitly enumerates a few domestic presidential powers, 
such as the pardon and appointments.1  Some scholars argue that the 
Framers intended this imbalance in constitutional specificity, as they 
meant for the President to possess only weak domestic powers subser-
vient to Congress.2  Yet, such an interpretation fails to capture the full 
powers of the presidency as created by the Framers—not to mention 
how the office of the President has developed over subsequent prac-
tice.  The Framers created a strong executive vested with the power to 
execute the laws.3  The President must also ensure that the laws are 
faithfully executed, creating a duty to oversee executive officials.4  
These two clauses together, the Vesting Clause and the Take Care 
Clause, grant the President significant authority to shape domestic 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 2011, University of 
California, Berkeley.  I would particularly like to thank Professor Cary Coglianese for all 
of his detailed feedback and support during the writing and research process of this 
Comment.  Finally, this Comment would not be in its present form without the hard work 
of the Volume 18 and 19 editors. 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. II. 
 2 See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On:  The Obama Administration’s Nonenforce-
ment of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 
(2013) (arguing that the Constitution does not vest the President with broad domestic 
powers). 
 3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 4 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. . . 
.”); John F. Manning, Foreword:  The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 45 
n.268 (2014) (positing that the Take Care Clause is best interpreted as imposing a duty to 
ensure faithful execution among the Executive Branch). 
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policy through the enforcement—as well as the selective nonen-
forcement—of the laws. 
The President’s authority in the domestic sphere is unique in that 
it is largely not an action-oriented power.5  Scholarship on executive 
authority often focuses on presidents and executive branch officials 
acting beyond their statutory authority, but presidents can also wield 
significant authority by under-enforcing a legislative scheme.6  When 
Congress vests executive authority in the President or an executive 
branch official, it is left to the executive branch to determine when 
and how to execute the law unless Congress has provided guidelines 
or has created a mandatory duty.  As a result, the President has con-
siderable discretion in executing the law, significantly impacting fed-
eral policymaking.7 
President Barack Obama has repeatedly used nonenforcement 
discretion during his administration, especially after the Democratic 
Party lost control of the House of Representatives in 2010.8  This 
Comment will look at two such instances—the delay of the employer 
mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) 
and the immigration enforcement directives announced on Novem-
ber 20, 2014—as vehicles to understand executive nonenforcement 
discretion.  The ACA requires large employers who do not offer 
health coverage to pay a penalty called the Employer Shared Respon-
sibility starting on December 31, 2013.9  Having previously delayed 
enforcement for 2014, the Treasury Department announced in Feb-
ruary 2014 that it would phase-in enforcement of the employer man-
date beginning in 2015.10  On immigration, President Obama an-
 
 5 See Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 
MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1199–200 (2014) (contending that inaction is an important presiden-
tial “power” while most of the President’s action-oriented powers are in the areas of for-
eign policy and national defense). 
 6 See id. (arguing that scholarship tends to focus on presidential action while ignoring pres-
idential “inaction” or nonenforcement). 
 7 See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Statutory Nonenforcement Power, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE 
ALSO 115, 121–22 (2013) (explaining how Congress can convey upon the President a lim-
ited statutory nonenforcement power). 
 8 The use of nonenforcement discretion can be traced back to President George Washing-
ton and was frequently used by Presidents George W. Bush and Ronald Reagan.  Daniel 
T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 807–16 
(2010) (reviewing examples of nonenforcement by past presidents). 
 9 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2015); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, § 1513(d), 124 Stat. 119, 256 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26 U.S.C.). 
 10 Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 8,544, 
8,577 (Feb. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 54, and 301); Press Release, De-
partment of the Treasury, Treasury and IRS Issue Final Regulations Implementing Em-
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nounced in November 2014 that his administration would change its 
immigration enforcement policies.11  First, the Department of Home-
land Security (“DHS”) would prioritize the removal of certain catego-
ries of illegal immigrants over others, focusing on threats to national 
security and criminals.12  Second, DHS would extend deferred action 
to illegal immigrants who are parents of children legally present in 
the United States.13 
Both decisions prompted quick condemnation from Republicans 
in Congress.14  The House of Representatives filed suit against the 
Obama Administration over the ACA decision alleging that the 
Treasury Department unilaterally amended the ACA by delaying the 
employer mandate for one year without legislation passed by Con-
gress.15  Similarly, twenty-six states sued DHS in the Southern District 
of Texas alleging that the enforcement policies violated the Presi-
dent’s constitutional duty to enforce the law under the Take Care 
Clause.16  On February 16, 2015, the district court judge assigned the 
case enjoined DHS from proceeding with deferred action.17  The 
 
ployer Shared Responsibility Under the Affordable Care Act for 2015 (Feb. 10, 2014), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2290.aspx. 
 11 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 
20, 2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/
remarks-president-address-nation-immigration. 
 12 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson for Thomas Winkowski, R. Gil Kerlikowske, Le-
on Rodriguez, Alan D. Bersin, Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of 
Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf. 
 13 Memorandum from Jeh C. Johnson for Leon Rodriguez, Thomas Winkowski, R. Gil Ker-
likowske, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to 
the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Par-
ents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_
action.pdf. 
 14 Ashley Parker, Boehner Says Obama’s Immigration Action Damages Presidency, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/us/republicans-immigration-
obama.html; Cathy Burke, Republicans Slam Obamacare’s Employer Mandate Delay as ‘Train 
Wreck’, NEWSMAX (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/obama-delays-
employer-mandate/2014/02/10/id/551999/. 
 15 Complaint at 23–26, United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-01967 
(D.D.C. 2014).  Other challenges to the ACA delay have been filed.  See, e.g., Kawa Ortho-
dontics, LLP v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 773 F.3d 243, 246, 248 (11th Cir. 
2014) (dismissing challenge for lack of standing); Ass’n of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, 
Inc. v. Koskinen, 768 F.3d 640, 642–43 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding no standing). 
 16 Complaint at 26–27, Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (No. B-
14-254). 
 17 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677–78 (S.D. Tex. 2015).  A federal district 
judge in Pennsylvania has also addressed the President’s immigration orders finding 
them to violate the separation of powers and the Take Care Clause.  United States v. Jua-
rez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 788 (W.D. Pa. 2014).  Unlike Texas v. United States, Juarez-
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Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction on November 9, 2015, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 19, 2016.18  Meanwhile, 
Republicans in Congress attempted to undo President Obama’s im-
migration enforcement decisions through legislation and appropria-
tion.19  These twin developments in the courts and Congress will set 
the stage for a showdown and public debate over executive power 
and the extent of presidential nonenforcement discretion.20 
The debate has already attracted legal scholarship, but so far most 
efforts have either been cursory or highly critical of nonenforcement 
discretion.  Supporters of nonenforcement discretion have either 
stopped their analysis at Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court deci-
sion that found that there was a presumption of unreviewability for 
nonenforcement decisions, or have focused their analysis on the le-
gality of particular nonenforcement decisions.21  Robert Delahunty 
and John Yoo have written the strongest critique of nonenforcement 
 
Escobar is not a challenge to the immigration orders, but a finding by a district court judge 
that the immigration orders did not apply to the defendant who was an illegal alien ar-
rested and detained by DHS.  Id. at 792. 
 18 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257 
(U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-674).  Because the Fifth Circuit did not address the constitu-
tional question, the Supreme Court asked the parties to explicitly brief and argue 
“[w]hether the Guidance violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 3.”  
United States v. Texas, 2016 WL 207257 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-674).  It was specu-
lated that the late Justice Antonin Scalia inserted this additional question.  Julia Preston, 
Scalia’s Death Fuels Uncertainty on Immigration Case, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/live/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at-79/scalia-on-
immigration/.  With his passing, the attorneys for the case and the Justices largely avoid-
ed the controversial and difficult Take Care Clause question.  Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment, United States v. Texas, No. 15-674 (2016). 
 19 See Ashley Parker, House Approves Homeland Security Budget, Without Strings, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/us/house-homeland-security.html 
(reporting the failed attempt by congressional Republicans to gut President Obama’s 
immigration decisions via amendments to the DHS appropriations bill). 
 20 The judicial route faces numerous obstacles not the least of which is standing.  Whether 
Congress has standing to challenge a president’s failure to take care that the laws are 
faithfully executed is outside the scope of this Comment.  For a brief discussion of the 
standing issue, see Lyle Denniston, Constitution Check:  Could the House Sue the President for 
Refusing to Carry out the Laws?, NATL. CONST. CENTER (June 24, 2014), 
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/06/constitution-check-could-the-house-sue-the-
president-for-refusing-to-carry-out-the-laws/ (discussing the issue of standing). 
 21 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (holding that that a refusal to enforce is 
generally unsuitable for judicial review because of agency discretion); Eric Posner, The 
Constitutional Authority for Executive Orders on Immigration is Clear, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/11/18/constitutional-limits-of-
presidential-action-on-immigration-12/the-constitutional-authority-for-executive-orders-
on-immigration-is-clear (arguing the President has the discretionary power to allocate re-
sources among immigration enforcement efforts); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The 
Statutory Nonenforcement Power, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 115, 116 (2013) (defending Pres-
ident Obama’s deferred action order for DREAMers). 
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discretion following President Obama’s decision in 2012 to apply de-
ferred action to DREAMers.22  They argue that the Take Care Clause 
imposes an absolute duty on the President to enforce all constitu-
tionally valid acts of Congress.23  The President can only ignore this 
duty, they claim, in limited situations where the act of Congress is un-
constitutional, equitable considerations are present for individual 
cases, resources are limited, or where there is de facto delegation.24  
To Delahunty and Yoo, these exceptions are defenses rather than 
sources of nonenforcement discretion, because such discretion can-
not exist given the Take Care Clause.25 
Zachary Price takes a more flexible approach.  He recognizes that 
nonenforcement discretion is a valid exercise of executive power but 
it is limited.26  A president cannot use policy-based nonenforcement 
that applies to categories of individuals.27 Therefore, according to 
Price, President Obama’s ACA and immigration decisions are invalid 
exercises of executive power because they take a categorical rather 
than an individual approach to nonenforcement.28 
Finally, Jeffrey Love and Arpit Garg argue that nonenforcement 
creates a separation of powers problem because it allows a president 
to act unilaterally, contrary to the designs of the Framers.29  However, 
the employer mandate delay is valid under a separation of powers 
theory of nonenforcement discretion, they argue, because the delay 
served the goals of the enacting Congress by ensuring smooth im-
plementation of the ACA.30 
These arguments against the Obama Administration’s actions ei-
ther reject executive nonenforcement discretion or find it extremely 
limited.  Yet what they lack is any focus on whether the statute in 
question imposes mandatory enforcement duties.  Law enforcement 
 
 22 DREAMers are illegal aliens who entered the United States before the age of sixteen 
(usually with their parents), who have not been convicted of a felony, have lived continu-
ously in the United States for five years, and have graduated from high school.  Immigra-
tion Policy Center, Who and Where the DREAMers Are:  A Demographic Profile of Immigrants 
Who Might Benefit from the Obama Administration’s Deferred Action Initiative, AM. IMMIGRATION 
COUNCIL (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/who-and-where-
dreamers-are.  See generally DREAM Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. § 3(a) (2001) (defining 
DREAMers). 
 23 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 784. 
 24 Id. at 836, 841–42, 845, 851–52. 
 25 Id. at 835. 
 26 Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 674 
(2014). 
 27 Id. at 675. 
 28 Id. at 752, 761. 
 29 Love & Garg, supra note 5, at 1202. 
 30 Id. at 1222. 
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is an executive function, and absent a statutory constraint to the con-
trary, the President possesses wide discretion over enforcement.  If a 
statute does not include any enforcement guidelines or conditions, as 
they often do not, then the President can interpret how and when to 
execute the law.  Where the statute imposes mandatory enforcement 
duties, then the President must carry out the letter of the law unless 
the President believes the statute is unconstitutional or Congress 
failed to allocate the necessary resources.  This theory of executive 
nonenforcement discretion best reflects the history and practice of 
executive power.  Delahunty and Yoo’s denial of nonenforcement 
discretion ignores the use of prosecutorial discretion by presidents 
starting with George Washington.31  The separation of powers thesis 
advocated by Love and Garg does not answer whether nonenforce-
ment discretion is constitutional.32  Price’s categorical-individual dis-
tinction, while practical, only has limited support in case law.33  An 
analysis focused on the discretionary-mandatory distinction best cap-
tures the nature of executive nonenforcement discretion. 
This Comment establishes a framework for understanding execu-
tive nonenforcement discretion.  It does not provide an in-depth and 
definitive examination of whether President Obama’s ACA and im-
migration nonenforcement decisions are constitutional; however, by 
creating the proper framework to understand nonenforcement prob-
lems based on the discretionary-mandatory distinction, it provides an 
initial answer in the affirmative, namely that the Obama Administra-
tion’s decisions are constitutional.  Part I provides a historical under-
standing of the Take Care Clause including the pre-ratification con-
text and initial interpretations of the clause during the early years of 
the United States.  Part II discusses the development of prosecutorial 
discretion as a basis for nonenforcement.  Part III explains the jump 
from prosecutorial discretion to executive nonenforcement in the 
administrative law context after Chaney.  Part IV examines executive 
discretion when a statute creates a mandatory duty.  Part V concludes 
by briefly applying the developed discretionary-mandatory framework 
to the Obama Administration’s decisions regarding the ACA and 
immigration. 
 
 31 See JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND:  THE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE 
WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 72 (2009) (noting that President Washington set the 
precedent of under-enforcing the law). 
 32 Love & Garg, supra note 5, at 1201. 
 33 See generally Letter from 136 Law Professors to President Barack Obama, Executive author-
ity to protect individuals or groups from deportation (Sep. 3, 2014), available at 
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/Law-Professor-Letter.pdf (discussing how prosecuto-
rial discretion fits into the immigration system). 
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I.  UNDERSTANDING THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE AND EXECUTIVE POWER:  
HISTORY, TEXT, AND THE FRAMERS 
The Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution 
are the foundations for executive nonenforcement discretion.  A 
pure textual reading of the clauses might lead to a conclusion that 
the Framers created a weak President with no enforcement discre-
tion.34  Such an interpretation is not consistent with the historical 
context of the Constitutional Convention and proclivities of the 
Framers who played key roles in crafting the presidency.  Popular 
consensus holds that the Framers created a weak President in reac-
tion to the abuse of the English Kings and their royal appointees, but 
this ignores the post-revolutionary period of weak executive control 
that informed the views of James Madison.35  To understand what the 
Framers created, one must first look to the British political inher-
itance and the events contemporaneous to the Constitutional Con-
vention.  Viewed through this perspective, the Framers created a 
strong executive, which entailed discretion, independent from Con-
gress. 
A.  British Foundations 
The British political and legal system had an immense yet contra-
dictory influence on the Framers.36  On one hand, abuses committed 
by the royally appointed colonial governors and representatives of the 
Crown fueled the American Revolution.  On the other hand, all of 
the Framers, except Alexander Hamilton, were raised to pledge alle-
giance to the King of England.37  The British system provided the 
Framers with one of the few working examples of effective—although 
not necessarily desirable—executive power.  British monarchial tradi-
tions infuse the American presidency as much as the presidency was 
designed to avoid the creation of a monarchy. 
The royal colonial governors wielded almost unchecked executive 
power as representatives of the King.38  As patrons of the King of Eng-
 
 34 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 799 (noting that a dictionary definition of faithful 
requires strict enforcement of the laws). 
 35 RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN:  THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 27 
(2009). 
 36 See generally CLEMENT FATOVIC, OUTSIDE THE LAW:  EMERGENCY AND EXECUTIVE POWER 
(2009) (discussing British political thought on the Framers and the presidency). 
 37 RAY RAPHAEL, MR. PRESIDENT:  HOW AND WHY THE FOUNDERS CREATED A CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
11 (2012).  Hamilton was born in the West Indies to a French Huguenot mother.  Id. 
 38 See id. at 22 (discussing powers of the colonial governors). 
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land, the colonial governors only owed allegiance to the Crown.39  
Early governors ruled with martial law.40  Later governors still wielded 
executive, judicial, and legislative powers in the colonies and could 
suspend bills passed by the local assemblies at will.41  All of the dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention could point to abuses by their 
former royal governors.42  The Virginia delegates, several of whom, 
such as George Mason and Edmund Randolph, would later dissent 
from the final draft for vesting too much executive power, could cite 
the governor of Virginia who decreed freedom for any slave who 
joined the British Army in 1775.43  The Framers also knew their Brit-
ish history and the reign of King James II.  Drawing on the long his-
tory of English monarchs suspending acts of Parliament, King James 
used his suspending and dispensing powers to exempt officials from 
restrictions on office-holding by Catholic and Protestant dissenters.44  
The Glorious Revolution of 1689 ended King James’s rule and the 
English Bill of Rights made the royal suspension and dispensing pow-
er illegal.45  Aware of this history, the Framers ensured that the Presi-
dent would not have unfettered powers that could lead to tyranny.46 
The Framers who played important roles in drafting the articles 
relating to the presidency at the Convention or shaping executive 
power after ratification all were predisposed to be sympathetic toward 
British conceptions of executive power.  Gouverneur Morris was 
raised in an aristocratic family as his father was Lord of Morrisania.47  
James Wilson was raised in Scotland and his “aristocratic pretensions” 
caused him to waiver in his support for independence in the early 
years of the Revolution.48  John Rutledge, who played an important 
role on the Committee of Detail supporting a strong executive, stud-
ied at Oxford and was admitted to practice before the Inns of Court 
in London.49  Alexander Hamilton was a vocal defender of the mon-
archy having said that “the British government is the best in the 
 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 26. 
 43 Id. at 27. 
 44 The royal suspension and dispensing power allowed the English monarch to ignore acts 
of Parliament.  Price, supra note 26, at 691. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See id. at 693 (noting that the Framers rejected a proposal to give the President broad 
suspension powers). 
 47 Morrisania comprised much of what is now the Bronx in New York City.  RAPHAEL, supra 
note 37, at 11. 
 48 BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 132. 
 49 Id. at 268. 
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world, and I doubt much whether anything short of it will do in 
America.”50  These men would have all been familiar with William 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.51  Blackstone was the 
most cited author at the Convention after Montesquieu, and his the-
ories were particularly noticeable in Hamilton’s writings.52  Blackstone 
had a very expansive conception of executive power, particularly over 
the execution of the laws.53  He believed that executive discretion was 
necessary:  “For, though the making of laws is entirely the work 
of . . . the legislative branch . . . the manner, time, and circumstances 
of putting those laws in execution must frequently be left to the dis-
cretion of the executive magistrate.”54 According to Clement Fatovic, 
the Federalists largely adopted this observation into their belief that it 
was occasionally necessary to mitigate the severity of the law in the in-
terests of justice, humanity, or right.55 
B.  Weak Executives under the Articles of Confederation 
Given the distrust of executive power during the independence 
period, the American revolutionaries turned to legislature-controlled 
government.  The result, however, was near disaster as government 
during the Revolutionary War and under the Articles of Confedera-
tion was ineffective.56  This period of weak government was more in-
fluential on the Framers who shaped the American presidency than 
the earlier colonial period of tyrannical governors.57 
The supporters of a nationalist vision of government and stronger 
executive power had first-hand experience with the failings of legisla-
tive controlled government.  Whereas Patrick Henry and George Ma-
son, each opponents of a stronger national government, came of age 
at a time when the biggest threat to liberty was taxes imposed by 
overbearing imperial governments and unrestricted exercises of pow-
er by royal governors, James Madison came of age as a delegate to the 
 
 50 Id. at 168.  This position cost him influence at the Convention, and his contributions to 
the ideas behind the Constitution are limited.  However, he played important roles in the 
ratification debates and during Washington’s presidency.  Id. at 169. 
 51 See Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996) (noting 
nearly as many copies were said to have been sold in the American colonies as in Eng-
land). 
 52 FATOVIC, supra note 36, at 125. 
 53 Id. 
 54 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *261. 
 55 FATOVIC, supra note 36, at 148. 
 56 See generally THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 20 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (detailing the power 
vacuum that existed during the period before the Constitutional Convention). 
 57 BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 27. 
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Continental Congress, where he witnessed the weaknesses of the Arti-
cles of Confederation and tyrannical state legislatures acting against 
the best interests of the nation.58  Likewise, Gouverneur Morris was a 
delegate to the Continental Congress from 1777–1779 where he wit-
nessed the government’s failures to provide supplies for American 
troops.59  The multiple, ineffective committees of the Continental 
Congress frequently frustrated George Washington while he waged 
war against the British.60  As a result, these men viewed a strong exec-
utive as a means of giving energy to the central government and cor-
recting the problems of the Articles of Confederation.61 
The lack of any meaningful executive authority was a crucial fail-
ing of the Articles of Confederation.  The Continental Congress, as 
the governing body of the Articles of Confederation, held legislative 
and executive power.  It executed the laws by appointing “such other 
committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the 
general affairs of the United States under their [Congress’] direc-
tion.”62  Eventually these ad-hoc committees became standing com-
mittees, but they were often overburdened by their combined legisla-
tive and executive responsibilities.63  When the Continental Congress 
was in recess, the Articles of Confederation created an executive body 
composed of one delegate from each state to carry on the business of 
Congress.64  However, the committee could only deal in matters that 
Congress had specified in advance and could not work on important 
matters of state.65  This system, which lacked “energy” (a word fre-
quently used by the Federalists when discussing the need for a strong 
executive),66 proved incapable of dealing with the problems facing 
the American states.67 
 
 58 Id. at 27–28. 
 59 Id. at 46. 
 60 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 39 (2008). 
 61 BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 56. 
 62 Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 
YALE L.J. 541, 600 (1994) (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 5 
(West)). 
 63 Id. at 601. 
 64 RAPHAEL, supra note 37, at 38. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See FATOVIC, supra note 36, at 176 (noting energy was a frequent theme that pervaded the 
Framers’ thoughts on the presidency). 
 67 KRAMNICK, supra note 56, at 20.  See also BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 15 (finding that the 
Articles of Confederation collapsed because state legislatures opposed efforts by the Con-
tinental Congress to levy taxes or pay loans). 
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The states similarly experimented with restricting executive pow-
er.68  Some states completely abolished the executive, and eight states 
established executive or privy councils.69  Except for South Carolina, 
the state constitutions eliminated the role of the governor in the leg-
islative process.70  The state constitutions created legislature-
controlled government which quickly proved incapable of executing 
the law.  Most states were in severe financial crises, so the legislatures 
freely printed money, passed debtor relief legislation, set aside con-
tracts, and confiscated property.71  To Madison, legislatures could be 
just as tyrannical as a strong executive.72  The inability of the states to 
confront Shays’ Rebellion signaled the death knell of the Articles of 
Confederation and pressed Madison, Randolph, Gouverneur Morris, 
Wilson, and Hamilton to call for a constitutional convention to em-
power the national government in stark contrast to the system of 
weak executive government created a decade earlier.73 
C.  The Constitutional Convention:  Drafting Executive Power and the Take 
Care Clause 
The Framers who would shape the American presidency gathered 
in Philadelphia in May 1787 to create a system of government dra-
matically different from the Articles of Confederation.  Madison’s 
Virginia Plan calling for a stronger national government would not 
have been well received a decade earlier during the revolutionary fu-
ror, but the failures of the Articles of Confederation and the states 
had softened distrust toward executive power.74  Gouverneur Morris 
and James Wilson were the principal authors and thinkers behind Ar-
ticle II, and they were two of the strongest nationalists at the Conven-
tion who wanted to correct the failings of the post-independence in-
stitutions.75  Therefore, any interpretation of presidential power 
should presumably be consistent with their predilection toward a 
strong national government. 
 
 68 RAPHAEL, supra note 37, at 39–40. 
 69 Id. 
 70 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 56, at 21. 
 71 Id. at 25. 
 72 BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 27. 
 73 Id. at 18, 21.  In 1786, Daniel Shays led an insurgency of indebted farmers against the 
Massachusetts government which had adopted a policy of fiscal restraint.  Id. at 16–17.  
The Continental Congress, which could not raise money to fund federal troops, was pow-
erless to stop the rebellion, forcing the Governor of Massachusetts to raise $20,000 from 
private donors to field a militia.  Id. at 18. 
 74 FATOVIC, supra note 36, at 158. 
 75 BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 56. 
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Early in the Convention, the debate was set between a single, 
strong, and independent executive versus an executive committee 
subservient to the legislature.76  A week into the Convention on June 
4th, the delegates approved a proposal creating a single executive.77  
Wilson argued that a council of executives would dilute authority and 
deprive the national government of “energy, dispatch, and responsi-
bility.”78  While dissenters would continue to push for an executive 
council throughout the Convention, the issue was settled for most 
delegates in favor of Wilson’s position of vesting executive authority 
in one individual.79  Two months later, after little progress, the dele-
gates submitted a resolution on the executive to the Committee of 
Detail: 
That a national executive be instituted, to consist of a single person; to be 
chosen by the national legislature, for the term of seven years; to be inel-
igible a second time; with power to carry into execution the national laws; to 
appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for; to be removable on 
impeachment, and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty; to re-
ceive a fixed compensation for the devotion of his time to publick [sic] 
service; to be paid out of the publick [sic] treasury.80 
The Committee of Detail would dramatically rework what would be-
come Article II including the Vesting and Take Care Clauses.81 
The Committee of Detail removed the executive’s “power to carry 
into execution the national laws” and replaced it with the Vesting 
Clause (“the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America”)82 and the Take Care Clause (“he shall take 
Care that the laws be faithfully executed”).83  Lawrence Lessig and 
Cass Sunstein argued that this change was meant to weaken the pres-
idency vis-à-vis Congress, removing any discretionary implied power 
 
 76 RAPHAEL, supra note 37, at 54. 
 77 BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 134. 
 78 Id. at 127. 
 79 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 60, at 34 (noting that Mason tried to reintroduce an ex-
ecutive council during the last week of the convention). 
 80 JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Gaillard Hund & James Brown Scott 
eds., 1920), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/debcont.asp (empha-
sis added). 
 81 The Committee of Detail consisted of Wilson, Rutledge, Randolph, Oliver Ellsworth, and 
Nathaniel Gorham.  Id.  Rutledge was good friends with Wilson and a strong advocate of 
executive power, having been governor of South Carolina where he was called “the Dicta-
tor.”  BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 267, 269.  Gorham and Ellsworth did not play significant 
roles on the committee.  See id. at 265 (discussing roles on the committee).  Randolph en-
tered the Convention as a vocal supporter of a strong national government, but his sup-
port faltered as more power was given to the President.  Id. at 266. 
 82 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 83 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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regarding how to carry into execution the laws.84  This interpretation 
fails to take into account the Framers’ desire for a strong executive 
and makes the assumption that Wilson would have allowed the 
Committee of Detail to weaken the presidency by removing enforce-
ment discretion.  Both clauses were additionally modified by the 
Committee of Style where Gouverneur Morris furthered the national-
ist agenda producing the current versions.85 
The Framers intended the Vesting Clause to grant executive pow-
er to the President.86  Hamilton viewed the clause as a general grant 
of power rather than merely identifying the recipient of the powers 
enumerated in Article II.87  Likewise, Madison believed that Article II 
vested all executive power in the President.88  Steven Calabresi and Kev-
in Rhodes argue that comparisons of the vesting clauses of Articles I, 
II, and III support Hamilton and Madison’s interpretations.  The 
Vesting Clause of Article III must be read as a grant of power; other-
wise, there would be no constitutional source of the judiciary’s au-
thority to act.89  Meanwhile, the Vesting Clause of Article II is linguis-
tically similar to Article III; therefore, the Vesting Clause of Article II 
must be read as a grant of power.90  Originally, the vesting clauses in 
each Article were identical but Gouverneur Morris altered the lan-
guage found in Article I to the current language so as to limit Con-
gress’s powers to the enumerated powers.91  Unitary Executive theo-
rists such as Calabresi and Prakash require an interpretation that all 
executive power is vested in the President.  For the purposes of this 
Comment, it is enough to reach only so far as to read the Vesting 
Clause as a grant of executive power. 
 
 84 Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 66 (1994). 
 85 See RAPHAEL, supra note 37, at 120 (finding that some scholars have argued that Gouver-
neur Morris exceeded the grant of authority given to the Committee of Style by making 
significant changes to strengthen the President and the national government).  Hamilton 
and Madison also were appointed to the Committee of Style, although most of the writing 
was delegated to Morris.  BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 346. 
 86 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator:  The Framers and the President’s 
Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 995 (1993).  Since the Take Care Clause condi-
tions the powers granted by the Vesting Clause, it is necessary to briefly examine the op-
eration of the Vesting Clause to understand the Take Care Clause. 
 87 Id. at 996. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:  Unitary Executive, Plu-
ral Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1176 (1992). 
 90 Id. at 1178. 
 91 Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator, supra note 86, at 996–97.  Gouverneur Morris’s 
preference for executive power elicited the observation from Madison that Morris was 
never “inclined to the democratic side.”  BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 346. 
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If the Vesting Clause is interpreted as a grant of executive power, 
then the Take Care Clause is best interpreted as a duty.92  Unfortu-
nately, there is little recorded debate during the Convention sur-
rounding the Take Care Clause.93  It appears that the clause may have 
been included to forbid the President from wielding a suspension 
power akin to the royal prerogatives of King James II.94  The Framers, 
however, did not understand the Take Care Clause as a presidential 
straitjacket.  During the debates on selection of the President, Wilson 
stressed the importance of keeping the President independent from 
the legislature otherwise the executive would become a “mere crea-
ture” of the legislature.95  If the Framers intended to give the Presi-
dent no discretion in executing the law, then they would have pre-
sumably adopted the plan originally proposed to the Committee of 
Detail to allow Congress to select the President.96  The President 
needed to be able to wield discretion in order to be an effective ex-
ecutive and able to check the legislature.  It is hard to fathom that 
two of the strongest supporters of executive power, Wilson and Gou-
verneur Morris, would have removed executive discretion from their 
drafts for the Committee of Detail and the Committee of Style.97 
The Committee of Style made one important change to the Take 
Care Clause.  The Committee of Detail’s version read, “he shall take 
care that the laws of the United States be duly and faithfully execut-
ed. . . .”.98 The Committee of Style removed the word “duly” in its re-
ported version that became the final text.99  Unfortunately, there is no 
recorded account of why the Committee made the change.100  John-
 
 92 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 62, at 583 (arguing that the Take Care Clause is a duty 
to faithfully carry out the grant of power in the Vesting Clause). 
 93 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 84, at 64.  Richard Beeman’s exhaustive historical study of 
the Constitutional Convention does not include any mention of the Take Care Clause.  
See generally BEEMAN, supra note 35 (failing to discuss the Take Care Clause). 
 94 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 62, at 583–84; Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking 
and Presidential Power:  A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 613 (1989). 
 95 BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 231.  See also Prakash, supra note 75, at 1001 (finding that Wil-
son did not believe faithful execution of the laws turned the President into a functionary 
of Congress). 
 96 See RAPHAEL, supra note 37, at 90 (suggesting that allowing Congress to select the Presi-
dent would have resulted in congressional insiders dominating the presidency). 
 97 Lessig and Sunstein suggest that the draft submitted to the Committee of Detail (“power 
to carry into execution the natl. laws”) allowed for executive discretion, but the final draft 
of the Committee of Detail (the Take Care Clause) removed that discretion.  Lessig and 
Sunstein, supra note 84, at 66; JAMES MADISON, supra note 80. 
 98 JAMES MADISON, supra note 80 (emphasis added). 
 99 Id. 
100 Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II:  Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. 
REV. L. & POL. 213, 227 (2015). 
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son’s Dictionary defines “duly” as “properly; fitly; in the due manner.”101  
This suggests a mechanical obligation to carry out the law.102  By re-
moving “duly” and focusing on “faithfully” executing the laws, the 
Committee gave discretion to the President.103  Eighteenth century 
usage of the word “faithfully” suggests an agency relationship with 
implied discretion rather than a requirement of strict adherence.104  
The evolution of the Take Care Clause at the Constitutional Conven-
tion shows that the Framers purposefully gave the President discre-
tion in enforcing the law. 
The Take Care Clause is a presidential duty to oversee and control 
the faithful execution of the laws.105 The President cannot suspend a 
valid mandatory or ministerial duty imposed by Congress, but execu-
tion of the law implies discretion to choose the manner, time, and 
circumstances of that execution as understood by Blackstone and his 
contemporaries among the Framers. 
D.  Interpreting the Confusion Created by the Constitutional Convention 
The document created by the Constitutional Convention was far 
from clear about presidential powers, something which caused much 
difficulty for the delegates throughout the Convention.  While the 
delegates were able to reach agreement on matters such as how to se-
lect the President, the veto, and treaty-making, the delegates never 
explicitly defined executive power.106  It would be left to others, such 
as Hamilton and the Supreme Court, to determine the extent of ex-
ecutive power.107 
Hamilton was quick to defend executive power during the ratifica-
tion debates and as Treasury Secretary to President Washington.  In 
Federalist No. 70, Hamilton made the case for a single executive as op-
posed to vesting executive power in multiple people or vesting power 
in a single individual but subjecting him to a council.108  Hamilton 
feared that vesting executive power into a plural executive would un-
 
101 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785). 
102 Blackman, supra note 100, at 228. 
103 Id. at 232. 
104 Price, supra note 26, at 698 (“[T]he Constitution suggests that proper performance of the 
executive function may require adherence to notions of justice, equity, and the public in-
terest, even at the expense of complete enforcement of each and every statutory man-
date.”). 
105 Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator, supra note 86, at 1001. 
106 BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 349. 
107 Washington’s presidency played a key role in defining executive power, but his views of 
executive power will be explored in Part II. 
108 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
1522 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:5 
 
dermine accountability and lead to a lack of vigor in government, 
which was a hallmark of the Articles of Confederation.109  In Federalist 
No. 72, Hamilton explicitly stated that the administration of govern-
ment falls within the executive department.110  The administration of 
government included tasks such as foreign affairs, finance, the appli-
cation and disbursement of funds appropriated by Congress, and the 
direction of war operations.111  Crucially, the persons “to whose im-
mediate management these different matters are committed ought to 
be considered as the assistants or deputies of the Chief Magistrate, 
and on this account they ought to derive their offices from his ap-
pointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject to 
his superintendence.”112  The Constitution vested executive power in 
a single individual who had the authority, with implied discretion, to 
oversee all other executive officers.  A few years later, Hamilton even 
more strongly explained executive power in his defense of President 
Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality designed to keep the Unit-
ed States out of war between Britain and France.113  Writing under the 
pseudonym Pacificus, Hamilton argued that the Vesting Clause in Ar-
ticle II was a general grant of power that belonged to the President.114  
Hamilton’s writings provide some clarity to the Vesting Clause and 
executive power, but he never directly addressed the Take Care 
Clause. 
The Take Care Clause has rarely been litigated, but two early Su-
preme Court decisions—Marbury v. Madison and Kendall v. United 
States ex rel. Stokes—provide the best post-ratification understanding of 
the clause.  Marbury is best remembered for judicial review, but the 
case provided the first judicial interpretation of the Take Care 
Clause.115  President Thomas Jefferson instructed Secretary of State 
Madison to withhold William Marbury’s commission as Justice of the 
Peace.116  Marbury challenged that Madison violated an act of Con-
gress by failing to deliver the commission.117  Chief Justice John Mar-
 
109 Id. at 406. 
110 THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 413. 
113 FATOVIC, supra note 36, at 200–01. 
114 Id. at 201–02.  Madison wrote in opposition to Hamilton under the pseudonym, Helvidi-
us, and argued for a reduced scope of executive power which was inconsistent with his 
views during the Convention that the executive must not be subservient to the legislature.  
Id. at 202–03. 
115 TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43708, THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE AND EXECUTIVE 
DISCRETION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAW 5 (2014). 
116 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 155 (1803). 
117 Id. at 155–56. 
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shall observed that “whether the legality of an act of the head of a 
department be examinable in a court of justice or not, must always 
depend on the nature of the act.”118  There are two types of acts.  The 
first type is a political action which remains in the discretion of the 
President alone, and there cannot be any power to control that dis-
cretion: 
[W]here the heads of departments are the political or confidential 
agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or ra-
ther to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discre-
tion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only po-
litically examinable.119 
The second type of action is a specific duty assigned by law: 
[W]hen [the President] is directed peremptorily [by the legislature] to 
perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the 
performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law, is amendable 
to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the 
vested rights of others.120 
Marshall created a distinction between discretionary duties (either 
statutory or constitutional) affecting the nation, versus mandatory or 
ministerial duties affecting individuals.121  Only the latter is enforcea-
ble in the courts.122 
The Supreme Court revisited the Take Care Clause in Kendall.123  
The case was brought by a group of mail carrier contractors against 
the Postmaster General for failing to comply with a federal law that 
directed the Postmaster General to provide for back pay.124  Suppos-
edly, the President directed the Postmaster to refuse to pay the 
amount owed to the mail carriers.125  Justice Thompson again ob-
served the distinction between discretionary acts, which are left to the 
President, and ministerial acts, which are beyond the control of the 
President: 
There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the ex-
ecutive department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the 
President.  But it would be an alarming doctrine, that Congress cannot 
impose upon any executive officer any duty they may think prop-
 
118 Id. at 165.  Since the Court found no jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion re-
mains dicta.  Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done:  An Essay on Mar-
bury v.  Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 253, 257 (2003). 
119 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166 (emphasis added). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610–13 (1838). 
124 Id. at 608. 
125 GARVEY, supra note 115, at 5. 
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er . . . this is emphatically the case, where the duty enjoined is of a mere ministerial 
character.126 
The Postmaster General was vested with no discretionary authority to 
ignore a ministerial duty required by law.127  The Court further held 
that the Take Care Clause was not a dispensing power.128  Kendall held 
that the Take Care Clause did not grant a broad suspension power 
akin to the former powers of the King of England, but it recognized 
broad executive discretion for non-ministerial acts.129  Marbury and 
Kendall stand for the proposition that the Take Care Clause requires 
that the President cannot ignore ministerial duties imposed by Con-
gress, while discretionary duties remain under the control of the Pres-
ident. 
E.  Summarizing the Historical Foundation 
The Framers intended to create a strong executive after witness-
ing the repeated failures of the Articles of Confederation and the 
states to wield effective executive power.  Wilson and Gouverneur 
Morris, the two principal drafters of Article II, were among the 
strongest supporters of a strong national government.  They created a 
single president vested with a broad grant of executive power quali-
fied by a duty to faithfully execute the law.  As understood by the 
Framers and later interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Take Care 
Clause prohibited a President from ignoring acts of the legislature 
akin to the royal prerogatives held by the English monarchy.130  How-
ever, the Framers also understood that executing the law implied dis-
cretion, otherwise there would have been no need to ensure the in-
dependence of the executive from the legislature.  As long as a 
congressional act grants discretionary authority, rather than creating 
a ministerial duty or cabining the President’s discretion through 
guidelines as will be explored in Part III, the President can execute 
the law as he sees fit. 
 
126 Kendall, 37 U.S. at 610 (emphasis added). 
127 Id. at 613. 
128 See id. (“To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithful-
ly executed implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the Con-
stitution, and entirely inadmissible.”). 
129 Id. at 610–13. 
130 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 807–08 (linking the Take Care Clause to the English 
Bill of Rights).  In their opposition to prosecutorial discretion, Delahunty and Yoo as-
sume that there is law to suspend and dispense; however, enforcement actions are unique 
because they are usually committed to agency discretion by law.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 
U.S. 821, 831 (1985).  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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II. THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
By virtue of the Vesting Clause in Article II, the President is grant-
ed the power to execute the law, which means law enforcement.  
Johnson’s Dictionary, published contemporaneously with the Revolu-
tionary period, defined “executive” as “having the power to put in act 
the laws.”131  Likewise, the Framers understood executive power to in-
clude law enforcement.132  This may require the President to use his 
executive authority to initiate, stop, or restrain execution of a law.133  
The doctrine of prosecutorial discretion did not fully emerge until 
after advancements in communication and the expansion of the fed-
eral government following the Civil War, but presidents since the 
founding wielded prosecutorial discretion. 
A.  The Founding Generation’s Approach to Prosecutorial Discretion 
Presidents starting with George Washington believed that they 
have the discretion to enforce the law.  Critics of prosecutorial discre-
tion point out that executive oversight of law enforcement has origins 
that are more recent.134  Harold Krent has argued that executive con-
trol over law enforcement did not exist at the founding, since Con-
gress did not provide the Attorney General with any mechanism to 
oversee federal district attorneys in the Judiciary Act of 1789.135  Exec-
utive branch officials repeatedly asked for oversight authority, but 
Congress denied authority until the Civil War.136  This account ig-
nores the fact that early presidents since Washington and Jefferson 
believed that they had a constitutional rather than a statutory authority 
to direct federal district attorneys.137  President Washington occasion-
ally issued instructions directly to the district attorneys with a citation 
to the Take Care Clause or the Vesting Clause.138  During the Whiskey 
Rebellion, President Washington directed his Attorney General to 
 
131 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785). 
132 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) 
(quoting Madison, “if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of 
appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws”); Saikrishna Pra-
kash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1701, 1735 (2005) (noting that Wilson 
believed that the ability to execute the law and control its execution by officers was the 
defining trait of a chief executive). 
133 Prakash, supra note 132, at 546. 
134 Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement:  Some Lessons from History, 
38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286 (1989). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 287–89. 
137 Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 132, at 553. 
138 Id. 
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supervise the indictment of individuals involved in the uprising.139  
However, he also instructed the district attorney to end prosecutions 
against two individuals who he believed were innocent.140  President 
Washington ordered prosecutors to ignore noncitizen violators of the 
Neutrality Act of 1794 based on considerations of justice and equity.141  
All of these instances of prosecutorial discretion elicited no backlash 
from Congress or the judiciary, which Prakash cites as evidence that 
the other branches found nothing wrong with President Washing-
ton’s exercise of enforcement discretion.142 
Similarly, President Jefferson believed that he had enforcement 
discretion authority granted from the Constitution.143  He strongly be-
lieved that the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional, and he 
directed the district attorneys to halt ongoing prosecutions.144  Presi-
dent Jefferson justified his enforcement discretion: 
The President is to have the laws executed.  He may order an offence 
then to be prosecuted.  If he sees a prosecution put into a train which is 
not lawful, he may order it to be discontinued and put into legal 
train . . . .  There appears to . . . be no weak part in any of these positions 
or inferences.145 
President Jefferson understood that the President could readily inter-
vene and direct enforcement actions to ensure faithful execution of 
the laws including the Constitution.146  Both Presidents Washington 
and Jefferson did not believe that the absence of statutory authority 
 
139 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 60, at 48. 
140 Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 132, at 554. 
141 Price, supra note 26, at 728. 
142 Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 132, at 558. 
143 President Jefferson usually premised his ability to use prosecutorial discretion on a theory 
of the presidential prerogative or duty to decline enforcement of laws that the President 
believes to be unconstitutional, rather than on a theory of general enforcement discre-
tion.  Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 813.  However, President Jefferson expanded his 
use of prosecutorial discretion beyond constitutionalism concerns in the later years of his 
presidency, especially when enforcing the Embargo Act.  CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 60, 
at 72–73. 
144 Although the Sedition Act expired before Jefferson entered office, the expiration did not 
terminate any ongoing prosecutions.  Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 132, at 560–
61. 
145 Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Vice President of the U.S., to Edward Livingston, U.S. At-
torney for the Dist. of N.Y. (Nov. 1, 1801), available at 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-35-02-0451. 
146 See id. (showing that President Jefferson believed the Executive could control prosecu-
tions, but did not identify whether his enforcement discretion specifically came from the 
Vesting Clause or the Take Care Clause). 
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to direct or suspend law enforcement was problematic because they 
believed such authority was granted by the Constitution.147 
B.  The Modern Conception of Prosecutorial Discretion 
The doctrine of prosecutorial discretion underwent a change dur-
ing the nineteenth century as the federal government expanded.  
During the early nineteenth century, the federal district attorneys 
operated independently of Washington, D.C., except when the Presi-
dent or his Attorney General felt the need to intervene.148  This 
framework made sense in an era when it was difficult to communicate 
detailed instructions in a timely manner.149  Moreover, the Attorney 
General did not have an office in Washington, D.C. and only had one 
clerk until 1850, making oversight of all federal enforcement imprac-
tical.150  The Attorney General was finally given supervisory authority 
over the federal district attorneys in 1861, and the Department of Jus-
tice (“DOJ”) was established in 1870 incorporating the district attor-
neys (now called United States Attorneys).151  Over the next century, 
federal prosecution was slowly centralized in DOJ headquarters.152  
Meanwhile, the federal criminal code rapidly expanded, resulting in 
a mismatch between the broad scope of federal law and the relatively 
small number of resources to enforce those laws.153  In 1873, there 
were 183 separate offenses; that number exceeded 1000 offenses by 
2009.154  Since the DOJ can only prosecute a small fraction of the cas-
es, prosecutorial discretion is frequently used to manage caseloads.155 
Reflecting these changes, the federal courts cemented the execu-
tive branch’s use of prosecutorial discretion and immunized it from 
judicial review.  Courts have based prosecutorial discretion on a sepa-
ration of powers argument recognizing that the Executive has wide 
 
147 See Price, supra note 26, at 676 (suggesting that executive officials from the beginning 
recognized that discretionary authority to decline enforcement of federal statutes was de-
rived from their executive role). 
148 Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 369, 392–93 (2009). 
149 Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, supra note 132, at 564. 
150 Beale, supra note 148, at 394. 
151 Id. at 395. 
152 The period also saw the U.S. Attorneys lose their own prosecutorial discretion to DOJ 
executive officers in Washington, making it easier for the President and the Attorney 
General to control federal law enforcement.  Id. at 398. 
153 Id. at 400. 
154 Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law:  Origins and Development, 
6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 7 (2009). 
155 See Beale, supra note 148, at 400–01 (noting the use of discretion by prosecutors). 
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discretion, notwithstanding the duty of the Take Care Clause.156  Unit-
ed States v. Cox, a Fifth Circuit case, is the most often cited case for this 
proposition.157  The court held that a district court could not force a 
United States Attorney to sign an indictment.158  In its discussion of 
prosecutorial discretion the court observed that “[t]he Attorney Gen-
eral is the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of the 
United States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offenses, 
be faithfully executed.”159  Since the Attorney General is an officer of 
the executive department, he exercises discretion as to whether the 
case should be prosecuted.160  Furthermore, “as an incident of the 
constitutional separation of powers . . . the courts are not to interfere 
with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of 
the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.”161  Cox 
establishes that prosecutorial discretion is an executive function de-
rived from the Take Care Clause’s faithful execution language, and 
courts cannot review a prosecutorial decision without violating sepa-
ration of powers. 
The Supreme Court took a similar approach, immunizing prose-
cutorial discretion from judicial review.162  In United States v. Nixon, the 
Supreme Court bluntly stated that “the Executive Branch has exclu-
sive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute 
a case.”163  While the Court did not provide any more detail behind its 
statement, the Court elaborated later in United States v. Armstrong.  
The Attorney General has “broad discretion” to enforce federal crim-
inal laws because he is designated by statute as the President’s dele-
 
156 See Krauss, supra note 154, at 10–11 (noting that the Take Care Clause is the most widely 
cited constitutional text to support the doctrine that prosecutorial discretion is inherently 
an executive function immune from judicial review given the separation of powers doc-
trine). 
157 Id. 
158 United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 172 (5th Cir. 1965). 
159 Id. at 171. 
160 Id.  Two years later, the Fifth Circuit held that prosecutorial discretion is always required, 
especially “when the interests of the nation require that a prosecution be foregone.”  
Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1967) (quoting Cox, 342 F.2d at 182 
(Brown, J., concurring)). 
161 Cox, 342 F.2d at 171. 
162 A century before Cox, the Supreme Court recognized that the district attorney, as an ex-
ecutive officer, has absolute discretionary control over the prosecution and may dismiss 
the case without review by the court.  The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 
(1868). 
163 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citing Cox, 342 F.2d at 171; The Confisca-
tion Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 457). 
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gate to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.164  The decision 
to prosecute is left to the Attorney General’s discretion and not sub-
ject to judicial review because it is within the “special province” of the 
Executive.165  By the 1980s and 1990s, prosecutorial discretion within 
the criminal law context was widely accepted by the courts as a valid 
exercise of executive power under the Take Care Clause. 
C.  Summarizing the Development of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutorial discretion has its roots in the founding.  Presidents 
Washington and Jefferson repeatedly intervened in prosecutions out 
of concern for equity or even policy preference.  They believed that 
their authority to direct prosecutions came from the Constitution.  
This view was adopted by the courts developing the modern doctrine 
of prosecutorial discretion where the Executive has near complete 
discretion to determine when and how to prosecute violations of fed-
eral law.  Just as the doctrine developed in response to the growth of 
federal criminal statutes after the Civil War, it was only a matter of 
time before prosecutorial discretion became a frequent tool of execu-
tive branch officials in reaction to the expansion of the administrative 
state after the New Deal. 
III.  THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE AND NONENFORCEMENT DISCRETION 
While prosecutorial discretion in the criminal law context is long 
recognized, prosecutorial discretion or enforcement discretion in the 
civil context is a more recent, but still well established, development.  
Enforcement discretion was not particularly necessary in the civil 
context until the rapid growth of the federal government and admin-
istrative agencies during the twentieth century.166  With the adoption 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in 1946, enforcement 
 
164 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); see also Wayte v. United States, 470 
U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (stating that the government has broad discretion over whom to 
prosecute); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S., 368, 380, n.11 (1982) (noting that selec-
tive enforcement is not a constitutional violation as long as it is not based on race, reli-
gion, or some other arbitrary classification). 
165 Id. (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)).  However, the immunity is 
qualified subject to certain restraints such as due process and equal protection.  See Unit-
ed States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979) (holding that the government has 
absolute discretion to prosecute “so long as it does not discriminate against any class of 
defendants”).  Other constraints will be discussed in Part III. 
166 There is some historical precedent for the use of prosecutorial discretion in the civil con-
text.  See The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 454 (involving the use of prosecutorial 
discretion regarding the condemnation of property used against the United States during 
the Civil War). 
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discretion was implicitly endorsed, as Section 701(a)(2) denied judi-
cial review for agency actions “committed to agency discretion by 
law.”167  With more government programs than resources available, 
under-enforcement (including nonenforcement) became a tool in 
the arsenal of presidents set on deregulation.168  Heckler v. Chaney, de-
cided in 1985, is the seminal case linking executive enforcement dis-
cretion in the criminal context to the civil context and creating a pre-
sumption of no judicial review for agency nonenforcement decisions 
unless Congress has cabined the agency’s discretion through statuto-
ry guidelines or mandatory language.169 
A.  The Run-Up to Chaney 
The D.C. Circuit addressed the connection between prosecutorial 
discretion and civil enforcement in isolated cases such as Adams v. 
Richardson.  That case involved a challenge against the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) for failing to take enforce-
ment actions to end segregation in public schools receiving federal 
funds.170  HEW attempted to liken its enforcement policy to the pros-
ecutorial discretion of the Attorney General, but the court found the 
specific facts of the case distinguishable from prosecutorial discretion 
in the criminal law context.171  The court found that Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 established “specific enforcement proce-
dures,” making Section 701(a)(2) of the APA inapplicable since there 
 
167 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).  The Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe 
interpreted this to mean instances where “statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a 
given case there is no law to apply.”  401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-
752, at 212 (1945)). 
168 President Ronald Reagan refused to enforce civil rights laws, President George H.W. 
Bush delayed implementation of environmental statutes, and President George W. Bush 
relaxed environmental rules.  Cheh, supra note 118at 266. 
169 See Michael Kagan, Binding the Enforcers:  The Administrative Law Struggle Behind President 
Obama’s Immigration Action, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 665, 673 (2016) (noting that Chaney is the 
leading case on prosecutorial discretion within the administrative law context); Peter 
Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion:  Deferred Action, Unlawful Presence, and Im-
migration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1239 (2010) (recognizing that Chaney linked prose-
cutorial discretion in criminal law to administrative law); Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same 
Coin:  Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 485 
(2008) (noting the volume of citations to Heckler v. Chaney); Richard M. Thomas, Prosecu-
torial Discretion and Agency Self-Regulation:  CNI v. Young and the Aflatoxin Dance, 44 ADMIN 
L. REV. 131, 134 (1992) (arguing that Chaney represented a turning point in the recogni-
tion of prosecutorial discretion in the administrative law context). 
170 Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1160-61 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
171 Id. at 1162. 
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was law to apply.172  More importantly, the court found that the facts 
of the case did not make it a pure enforcement discretion case since 
HEW was affirmatively providing funds to civil rights violators (con-
trary to the statute) rather than merely declining to prosecute civil 
rights abusers.173  Adams acknowledged the similarity between crimi-
nal prosecutorial discretion and civil enforcement discretion, but the 
court declined to find that HEW had enforcement discretion because 
the statute was clear in mandating the means of enforcement.174 
B.  The Heckler v. Chaney Decision 
After Adams, Chaney significantly altered the scope of judicial re-
view over nonenforcement decisions and expanded the underlying 
support for nonenforcement discretion in the civil context.  Inmates 
on death row sued the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to 
take enforcement action to prevent certain legal injection drugs to be 
used in executions.175  The petitioners argued that the drugs had not 
been tested and labeled for use in human executions contrary to pro-
visions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.176  The FDA declined to 
act, arguing that it had discretion not to act unless there was “a seri-
ous danger to the public health or a blatant scheme to defraud.”177 
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist found that there was 
no law to apply in enforcement decisions, making them presumably 
immune to judicial review under the APA.178  Justice Rehnquist tied 
civil enforcement discretion to criminal prosecutorial discretion.  He 
observed that it was well-established precedent that “an agency’s deci-
sion not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal 
process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute 
discretion.”179  An agency deserves discretion and immunity from ju-
dicial review in part because decisions not to enforce often involve 
balancing factors that are within the agency’s expertise.180  The agen-
cy is best placed to determine enforcement priorities, the likelihood 
 
172 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (setting enforcement procedures such as making findings 
on the record and providing for a hearing). 
173 The language of the court suggests that this was dispositive of the case.  Id. 
174 Id.  Thus, the case is consistent with Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410 (discussing the “no law 
to apply” standard). 
175 Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 
661 (1985); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 823 (1985) (summarizing the facts). 
176 Sunstein, supra note 175, at 661. 
177 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 824–25. 
178 Id. at 837–38; see also Sunstein, supra note 175, at 662 (discussing the holding). 
179 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831. 
180 Id. 
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of enforcement success, how the enforcement action fits within the 
agency’s policies, and whether the agency has the resources to en-
force in the first place.181  Justice Rehnquist recognized that an agen-
cy’s refusal to enforce shares many of the characteristics of a prosecu-
tor’s decision not to indict.182  Just as past courts premised 
prosecutorial discretion on the Take Care Clause, Justice Rehnquist 
linked civil enforcement discretion to the President’s duty to faithful-
ly execute the laws establishing a constitutional basis for nonen-
forcement.183 
The Court in Chaney affirmed earlier cases that there was a distinc-
tion between discretionary acts and mandatory duties.184  Like Marbury 
and Kendall, the Chaney Court found a dividing line between statutes 
which imposed a mandatory duty on the Executive and statutes that 
left discretion to the Executive.185  Since there is no law to apply in the 
latter, only the former can be reviewed by the courts.186  In the most 
recent nonenforcement case to reach a circuit court, the D.C. Circuit 
reaffirmed the discretionary-mandatory distinction established by the 
Supreme Court.187  The court observed that the President can only 
use prosecutorial discretion in enforcement actions.188  Prosecutorial 
discretion cannot be used to ignore a statutory obligation or mandate 
such as a requirement to issue rules, pay benefits, or administer statu-
tory programs.189  After Chaney, the courts have given the President 
significant deference over discretionary actions such as enforcement, 
so long as Congress does not establish any mandatory duties.190 
 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 832. 
183 Id.  Justice Rehnquist found constitutional support for enforcement discretion in the 
Take Care Clause, but the holding in Chaney was also premised on the APA’s § 701 since 
enforcement decisions were actions committed to agency discretion unless otherwise in-
dicated by Congress.  Id. at 838. 
184 Id. at 837. 
185 See supra pp. 1524–26. 
186 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985). 
187 In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 266 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  The case considered whether the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) could refuse to comply with the Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act requiring the NRC to consider the Department of Energy’s license to store nu-
clear waste at Yucca Mountain.  Id. at 384. 
188 Id.  Judge Kavanaugh heavily relied upon the Pardon Power to defend prosecutorial dis-
cretion rather than a pure Take Care Clause analysis.  See id. at 263–64 (discussing how 
the Pardon Power allows the President to moderate the law and under-enforce a statute 
to protect individual liberty). 
189 See id. at 266 (“[P]rosecutorial discretion encompasses the discretion not to enforce a law 
against private parties; it does not encompass the discretion not to follow a law imposing a 
mandate or prohibition on the Executive Branch.”). 
190 See Biber, supra note 169, at 485, n.89 (noting that Chaney has been cited hundreds of 
times by federal appellate courts). 
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C.  Limits to Nonenforcement Discretion 
Chaney established a broad basis for nonenforcement discretion so 
long as there is no law to apply; however, it also set certain limits that 
differentiate it from the near absolute discretion held by the Execu-
tive in the criminal context.  The discretion held by the Executive in 
the civil context is rebuttable under two circumstances:  (1) Congress 
has limited the Executive’s discretion by setting substantive priorities 
or circumscribing how an agency can discriminate among issues or 
cases; or (2) the Executive has adopted a general policy that is so ex-
treme as to “amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibili-
ties.”191 
Congress can restrict executive nonenforcement discretion 
through statutory guidelines that the President must follow.192  The 
President cannot freely “disregard legislative direction in the statuto-
ry scheme that the agency administers.”193  Statutory deadlines that 
compel the Executive to act by a certain date are the simplest exam-
ples of statutory guidelines.194  Other guidelines include substantive 
priorities such as factors that the Executive must consider.195  Statuto-
ry guidelines rebut the presumption that there is no law to apply, but 
Chaney recognized that it is difficult to determine exactly when Con-
gress has left an issue to agency discretion.196  Thus, nonenforcement 
discretion analysis becomes a task of statutory interpretation to de-
termine if the statute is clear in mandating action or otherwise cir-
cumscribing how the Executive can employ its discretion.197 
 
191 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 & n.4.  There appears to be overlap between the two circumstanc-
es since a case involving the Executive disregarding statutory guidelines would amount to 
an abdication. 
192 Subject to limitations that will be discussed in Part IV. 
193 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833; see Sunstein, supra note 175, at 670 (finding that the Take Care 
Clause does not allow the President to decline enforcement of laws that he does not like). 
194 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”:  When Agencies Defer Decisions, 
103 GEO. L.J. 157, 177 (2014).  For example, “The Secretary shall enforce violations of 
the provisions in this statute beginning January 1, 2016.” 
195 Chaney, 470 at 833; see also Adams, 480 F.2d at 1162–63 (holding that the plain language of 
the statute clearly created an affirmative enforcement duty that could not be ignored by 
the agency).  For example, “The Secretary shall consider X and Y in enforcing violations 
of the provisions in this statute.” 
196 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 (“How to determine when Congress has done so is the question 
left open by Overton Park.”). 
197 As will be explored in Part IV, even statutory guidance or other mandatory commands 
can be subject to discretion in certain circumstances.  See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra 
note 194, at 177–78 (noting that resource scarcity may prevent an agency acting as Con-
gress directed). 
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Under a second limitation imposed by Chaney, the Executive can-
not adopt a general policy of nonenforcement that “is so extreme as 
to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”198  The 
Court did not elaborate other than to cite Adams v. Richardson for the 
proposition that the Executive cannot ignore a statute that establishes 
a clear mandatory or ministerial duty.199  Below this extreme position, 
the lower courts and scholars have struggled to determine the scope 
of an “abdication.”200  Zachary Price argues that only case-by-case de-
terminations are permitted since categorical, policy-based nonen-
forcement decisions amount to an abdication.201  Lower courts agree 
that Chaney shields single-shot or case-by-case enforcement decisions 
from review.202  An enforcement action that falls between a policy of 
ignoring a statutory mandate and a one-shot action presents a much 
more difficult case yet remains constitutional despite the argument 
presented by Price.203 
Categorical nonenforcement decisions will be upheld where the 
nonenforcement decision is for a limited duration or where the poli-
cy does not eliminate case-by-case discretion.  The Eighth Circuit in 
Kenney v. Glickman interpreted Chaney to foreclose an agency from es-
tablishing a permanent enforcement standard or policy.204  The D.C. 
Circuit in Schering Corp. v. Heckler found that a delay of enforcement 
activities “falls squarely within the confines of Chaney.”205  The FDA 
decided to delay enforcement against a pharmaceutical company for 
eighteen months pending review of whether the company’s drug was 
subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.206  While Scher-
ing Corp. was a one-shot nonenforcement decision, Sunstein and 
 
198 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4. 
199 The Court in Chaney declined to determine whether judicial review would be available 
even in a situation similar to Adams, except noting that a statutory mandate or other en-
forcement guidelines would suggest that the action was not committed to agency discre-
tion.  Id. 
200 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 194, at 185. 
201 See Price, supra note 26, at 675 (discussing categorical nonenforcement in the context of 
congressional primacy). 
202 See Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.2d 1118, 1123 (8th Cir. 1996) (“This language suggests that 
Chaney applies to individual, case-by-case determinations of when to enforce existing reg-
ulations rather than permanent policies or standards.”); Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. 
v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding no basis for judicial review of single-
shot nonenforcement decisions). 
203 Recently, in dicta, the D.C. Circuit found a broad basis for the President to exercise en-
forcement discretion including categorical or policy-based nonenforcement.  In re Aiken 
Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 266 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
204 Kenney, 96 F.3d at 1123. 
205 779 F.2d 683, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
206 Id. 
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Vermeule found that the case law suggests that a temporary morato-
rium from enforcing discretionary duties would not amount to an 
abdication.207 
The D.C. Circuit has found that nonenforcement policies that did 
not restrain individual discretion would not constitute an abdication 
of a statutory responsibility.  In Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan v. 
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the court held that the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission’s opinion about nonenforcement of 
certain quality assurance regulations did not require mandatory 
compliance; therefore, it did not amount to an abdication.208  The 
problem with general policies of nonenforcement is that they often 
look like legislative rulemaking in violation of the APA.209  Courts, 
however, have found that non-binding agency general statements of 
policy do not amount to legislative rules.210  Thus, the Executive can 
take a categorical approach to nonenforcement so long as it does not 
remove the possibility of case-by-case discretion.  In defending the le-
gality of the November 2014 immigration decisions, the Office of Le-
gal Counsel argued that general policies of nonenforcement that 
“merely provide a framework for making individualized, discretionary 
assessments about whether to initiate enforcement actions in particu-
lar cases” would not be an abdication of an agency’s statutory respon-
sibilities.211  A policy of nonenforcement is consistent with Chaney so 
long as it does not create a binding duty on agency officers executing 
the law by removing their individual enforcement discretion. 
D.  Summarizing Nonenforcement Discretion after Chaney 
Chaney firmly established that nonenforcement discretion of civil 
statutes is a valid exercise of executive power akin to prosecutorial 
 
207 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 194, at 193. 
208 Safe Energy Coal. of Mich. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 866 F.2d 1473, 1477 
(D.C. Cir. 1989). 
209 See Crowley Caribbean Transp. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 676–77 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that 
general statements are more likely to include interpretations of statutes rather than a fac-
tual assessment that is associated with one-shot enforcement actions); Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 171 (1996) (discussing the connection 
between non-enforcement policies and enforcement guidelines that the agency treats as 
“binding” in the context of rulemaking subject to § 553 of the APA). 
210 See U.S. Tel. Ass’n. v. FCC, 28 F.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C.  Cir.  1994) (finding that the action 
was not a general statement of policy because it created a binding framework of penal-
ties); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (concluding that 
the FDA’s policy had binding effect making it a legislative rule requiring § 553 notice-
and-comment procedures). 
211 The Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully 
Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 1, 7 (2014). 
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discretion.  The Court found authority for enforcement discretion 
partially in the Take Care Clause, insulating nonenforcement deci-
sions from judicial review.212  The President has broad nonenforce-
ment discretion as long as there is no law to apply unless Congress 
has established clear statutory enforcement guidelines.  However, the 
restrictions on the discretion identified by Chaney are weaker than 
they may seem on paper.  As will be explored in the next part, a Pres-
ident can ignore mandatory duties created by Congress when the du-
ty is unconstitutional or when Congress has failed to allocate re-
sources.  Finally, the “abdication of a statutory responsibility” 
standard has only been used to invalidate executive discretion when 
the Executive ignored clear, mandatory statutory language as in Ad-
ams.213  Anything less, including temporary enforcement delays or 
non-binding general policies, is a valid exercise of nonenforcement 
discretion. 
IV.  EXCEPTIONS TO ENFORCING MANDATORY DUTIES:  
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES AND RESOURCE SCARCITY 
Even mandatory statutory duties do not need to be enforced in 
every instance.  As established in the previous part, Congress can es-
sentially convert a discretionary duty into a mandatory duty by includ-
ing enforcement guidelines.  Mandatory duties must be met by the 
Executive, as held in Marbury and Kendall.214  However, Presidents, 
courts, and scholars have long recognized that mandatory duties can 
be defeasible.215  Most recently in In re Aiken County, the D.C. Circuit 
concluded that the President can decline to follow a statutory man-
 
212 The Court connected enforcement discretion to the Take Care Clause: 
[A]n agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characters 
of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict-a decision 
which has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, in-
asmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to “take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.” 
  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (citing U.S. CONST. art II, § 3).  However, 
the Court grounded much of its reasoning in the APA.  Id. at 837. 
213 See, e.g., Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that the 
EPA interpreted the law to change the substantive requirements of the law); Nat’l. Wild-
life Fed. V. EPA, 980 F.2d 765, 773–74 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (concluding that there was law to 
apply precluding agency discretion). 
214 See supra text accompanying notes 115 and 129. 
215 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 835 (recognizing that the President can decline to 
enforce a law in a number of circumstances). 
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date if the statute is unconstitutional or Congress has failed to allo-
cate funds.216 
A.  Unconstitutional Statutes 
The President can decline to enforce a statute imposing a manda-
tory or ministerial duty that he believes to be unconstitutional.217  The 
Take Care Clause creates a duty to enforce the laws, which includes 
the Constitution.218  Since the President is charged with enforcing the 
law and the Constitution is superior to laws passed by Congress, the 
President must favor the Constitution over the statute.219  Delahunty 
and Yoo argue that an unconstitutional act of Congress is void and 
cannot be law; thus, the President is under no obligation to enforce 
the act of Congress.220  The authority to disregard unconstitutional 
statutes also derives from the presidential oath.221  The oath prohibits 
the President from enforcing an unconstitutional statute since he 
would be a participant in violating the Constitution.222  President Jef-
ferson refused to enforce the Alien and Sedition Acts because he be-
lieved that the Acts were unconstitutional and infringed on individual 
rights.223  Taking a more limited perspective, some scholars have pro-
 
216 In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 
2, at 836, 845 (finding no executive nonenforcement power but conceding that the Ex-
ecutive can decline to enforce a statute if it is unconstitutional or Congress has failed to 
provide sufficient resources). 
217 See YOO, supra note 31, at 45–46 (arguing that the refusal to enforce an unconstitutional 
statute derives from the President’s control over law enforcement); Robert J. Delahunty, 
The Obama Administration’s Decisions to Enforce, But Not Defend, DOMA § 3, 106 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 69, 71 (2011) (finding that the President has a constitutional basis to de-
cline enforcement of unconstitutional statutes); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Execu-
tive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1617 (2008) (arguing that 
the President has a duty to disregard unconstitutional statutes); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, 
The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351, 411 (2014) (declining to enforce an unconsti-
tutional law is an important feature of the Madisonian system of checks and balances). 
218 Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, supra note 217, at 1627 
(“Per the Faithful Execution Clause, which requires him to ‘take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed,’ the President has a duty to enforce federal law, including the Consti-
tution.”).  See also In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d at 261 (noting that the Take Care Clause’s 
reference to “Laws” includes the Constitution, which is superior to a statute). 
219 Id. 
220 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 836. 
221 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully exe-
cute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, pre-
serve protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.”). 
222 Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, supra note 217, at 1629. 
223 President Jefferson even believed that a court decision finding a statute to be constitu-
tional did not constrain his discretion in enforcing the statute if he believed the statute 
was unconstitutional.  YOO, supra note 31, at 106–07.  But see In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d at 
259 (finding that the President can decline to enforce a mandatory duty on constitutional 
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posed a structural argument that the President has the authority to 
refuse enforcement of a statute that infringes on his own powers pre-
scribed by the Constitution.224  Calabresi and Prakash argue that re-
quiring the President to enforce unconstitutional statutes would un-
dermine the separation of powers envisioned by the Framers during 
the Constitutional Convention.225  The President can (and scholars 
such as Prakash argue “must”) decline enforcement of unconstitu-
tional statutes even when they impose mandatory or ministerial duties 
in order to uphold the Constitution.226 
B.  Resource Scarcity 
The President may insert discretion into a mandatory statutory 
scheme when Congress fails to allocate sufficient funds.  The Presi-
dent cannot perform the impossible, and if Congress has failed to 
make the necessary appropriations then the President is excused 
from fully executing the letter of the law.227  Without adequate fund-
ing, the law becomes at odds with itself, since the Executive cannot 
do what Congress directed.228  In such cases, Sunstein and Vermeule 
argue, the courts “must recognize a degree of flexibility.”229  However, 
the Executive cannot completely ignore a statutory mandate only be-
cause Congress failed to appropriate the necessary funds.230  In the 
absence of full funding, the Executive is still required to effectuate 
the statutory scheme within the funding constraints.231  In In re Aiken 
County, the D.C. Circuit found that the NRC had to complete the li-
censing process for the Yucca Mountain project, a ministerial duty, 
 
grounds as long as a final order by the court has not rejected the claim of unconstitution-
ality). 
224 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 62, at 621–22 (arguing that the President has the 
means to refuse enforcement of laws that usurp his constitutional powers). 
225 Id. at 621–24; see also supra text accompanying note 95 (discussing how Wilson did not 
want the Executive to become a “mere creature” of the legislature). 
226 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 62, at 621; see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 836 
(arguing that the President has a duty to enforce the Constitution, which is a more im-
portant duty than enforcing an (unconstitutional) statute). 
227 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 845. 
228 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 194, at 177–79. 
229 Id. at 178. 
230 In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d 255, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
231 City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Sunstein & Ver-
meule, supra note 194, at 180 (noting that given a conflict between resource constraints 
and a statutory deadline, the deadline has priority and the agency should try its best to ef-
fectuate the statute).  But see In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d at 270 (Garland, C.J., dissenting) 
(finding that partial application of the statute, given the resource constraints, would lead 
to bad policy). 
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even in the absence of full funding from Congress.232  The NRC could 
only stop the licensing process if there were no appropriated funds 
remaining.233  In the mandatory statutory duty context, resource con-
straints is a limited exception to the general rule that the President 
must enforce the law.  The President may exercise discretion, but he 
must apply the law to the full extent allowable by funding. 
V.  APPLYING THE EXECUTIVE NONENFORCEMENT DISCRETION 
FRAMEWORK TO THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION DECISIONS 
The President has broad nonenforcement discretion as long as 
Congress has not established any mandatory guidelines to restrict his 
discretion.  Whether the President’s use of nonenforcement discre-
tion is constitutional is a two-step process.  First, it must be deter-
mined whether the action in question is an enforcement action of the 
type protected by Chaney and akin to prosecutorial discretion.  Minis-
terial or other mandatory duties imposed by Congress are not insu-
lated from judicial review by Chaney.  Second, the inquiry must de-
termine whether the statute includes any mandatory language or 
statutory guidelines that would restrict or remove the President’s dis-
cretion.  If the action is a discretionary enforcement action without 
any law to apply, then the Executive is free to not enforce the law.  
Under this analysis, the delay in enforcing the ACA employer man-
date and the policy announced about immigration enforcement are 
both valid exercises of executive nonenforcement discretion. 
A.  The ACA and the Employer Mandate 
The delay of the ACA’s employer mandate is a valid exercise of 
executive nonenforcement discretion and presents an easy case.  The 
employer mandate is a penalty placed on certain employers for fail-
ing to provide health insurance to their employees.234  Enforcing a 
penalty is an enforcement action.  The statute contains no mandatory 
language other than to define large employers as businesses that em-
ploy over fifty workers and provide how the penalty should be calcu-
lated.235  Congress did not direct or constrain how the Executive 
could enforce the penalty.  The statute contains an effective date pro-
vision, but the provision merely says that employers would be subject 
 
232 In re Aiken Cnty., 725 F.3d at 267. 
233 Id. 
234 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2015). 
235 Id. 
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to the penalty starting after December 31, 2013; it is not a mandatory 
command to the Treasury Secretary to begin enforcement on that 
date.236  As in Kenney v. Glickman, this is only a temporary delay rather 
than a permanent decision not to enforce the law.  The decision was 
a delay in order to develop better enforcement procedures rather 
than a permanent decision not to enforce the law.237  The delay of the 
employer mandate is entirely within the President’s discretion, mak-
ing it a valid exercise of executive nonenforcement discretion. 
B.  The Immigration Decisions 
The immigration decisions present a more difficult case due to 
the scope of the decisions and the complex nature of the underlying 
immigration statutes.  The President’s orders are enforcement ac-
tions since they involve decisions of enforcing the immigration stat-
utes.  Removal proceedings share more in common with a prosecu-
tor’s decision to indict than the decision to delay the ACA employer 
mandate.238  The Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States recognized 
that executive officials have broad discretion over immigration en-
forcement.239  Federal officials have the discretion even to decide 
whether to pursue removal and to determine the relief that would al-
low undocumented aliens to remain in the country.240  President 
Obama’s immigration decisions comprise two distinct actions:  (1) 
prioritizing the removal of certain aliens over others; and (2) extend-
ing deferred action to certain aliens who are parents of legally pre-
sent children. 
 
236 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1513(d), 124 St. 119, 
256 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
237 See Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
8,545 (implementing the delay); see also Press Release, Department of the Treasury, 
Treasury and IRS Issue Final Regulations Implementing Employer Shared Responsibility 
Under the Affordable Care Act for 2015 (announcing the delay); Kenney v. Glickman, 96 
F.2d 1118, 1123 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that permanent enforcement policies would 
amount to abdications of statutory responsibilities under Chaney). 
238 See The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain 
Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. 
O.L.C. at 3 (2014) (detailing removal procedures and the role of the Secretary of DHS in 
deciding whether to order removal). 
239 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). 
240 Id.; see also 6 U.S.C. § 202 (“The Secretary . . . shall be responsible for . . . establishing na-
tional immigration enforcement policies and priorities.”) (emphasis added); 8 U.S.C. § 
1103(a)(3) (“[The Secretary of DHS] shall establish such regulations . . . and perform 
such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions 
of this chapter.”). 
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1.  Removal Prioritization 
As part of the immigration nonenforcement actions, DHS an-
nounced that it would focus its enforcement actions on high priority 
individuals.241  The enforcement plan has three priorities.  The high-
est priority are aliens who are threats to national security and crimi-
nals who committed felonies, followed by aliens who committed mis-
demeanors or entered the United States after January 1, 2014, and 
finally, aliens who were issued a final order of removal after Decem-
ber 31, 2013.242  This prioritization is valid so long as it is not contrary 
to any direction from Congress. 
Unlike the ACA delay, Congress has established statutory guide-
lines and priorities that must be followed unless there is a constitu-
tional issue or resource constraint.243  DHS contends that Congress 
has only appropriated enough resources to remove fewer than 
400,000 aliens each year out of a total population approximating 11.3 
million undocumented aliens.244  It can under-enforce the statutory 
guidelines and insert its discretion so long as it uses available re-
sources to effectuate the statutory scheme as fully as possible.  DHS’s 
prioritization roughly matches the statutory guidelines set in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a).  Under the statute, inadmissible aliens include individuals 
who are convicted criminals,245 who pose a threat to national security 
or public health,246 who are likely to become public charges,247 or who 
are illegally present.248  Similarly, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 sets classes of de-
portable aliens who can be removed at the discretion of the Secretary 
of DHS.249  DHS’s prioritization, while not as encompassing as the 
statute, mirrors the congressional guidelines by focusing on criminals 
and individuals who pose threats to national security.250  In Texas v. 
 
241 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson for Thomas S. Winkowski, R. Gil Kerlikowske, 
Leon Rodriguez, Alan D. Bersin, Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal 
of Undocumented Immigrants at 3–4. 
242 Id. 
243 See generally Margulies, supra note 169 (discussing immigration law and nonenforcement). 
244 The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Al-
iens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. 
O.L.C. at 9 (2014). 
245 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). 
246 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3). 
247 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4). 
248 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6). 
249 8 U.S.C. § 1227.  The classes mirror the categories listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (e.g., crim-
inals, threats to national security, etc.). 
250 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson for Thomas S. Winkowski, R. Gil Kerlikowske, 
Leon Rodriguez, Alan D. Bersin, Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal 
of Undocumented Immigrants at 3. 
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United States, the district court agreed with DHS, finding that deter-
minations of how to prioritize limited resources were entirely within 
the Executive’s discretion.251  The removal prioritization decision is a 
valid exercise of nonenforcement discretion given limited resources, 
and it is consistent with the statutory guidelines. 
2.  Deferred Action 
Deferred action is the second component of President Obama’s 
immigration decisions and is the primary subject of the legal chal-
lenge against DHS in Texas v. United States.  Deferred action is a form 
of administrative relief that allows DHS to defer the removal of an il-
legal alien for a period of time.252  Versions of deferred action have 
existed since at least the 1960s to ameliorate harsh and unjust out-
comes.253 The November 2014 deferred action program expanded 
coverage of the 2012 DACA program for DREAMers and applied de-
ferred action to individuals who have children in the United States 
who are citizens or lawful permanent residents, subject to certain 
conditions.254 
Deferred action is a proper exercise of executive nonenforcement 
discretion.  First, the policy is consistent with the statutory guidelines 
since an individual is only eligible for deferred action if they have a 
child who is a citizen or permanent resident, have continuously re-
sided in the United States since January 1, 2010, and are not an en-
forcement priority.255  The conditions in the 2014 deferred action 
program mirror the statutory scheme set by Congress in 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(b)(1).256 
 
251 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 645 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
252 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson for Leon Rodriguez, Thomas S. Winkowski, R. 
Gil Kerlikowske, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who 
Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are 
the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents at 2. 
253 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 612. 
254 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson for Leon Rodriguez, Thomas S. Winkowski, R. 
Gil Kerlikowske, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who 
Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are 
the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents at 4.  The conditions require that the 
individual has continuously resided in the United States since January 1, 2010, was physi-
cally present in the United States when the memorandum was issued (November 20, 
2014), and is not a removal priority.  Id. 
255 Compare id., with 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). 
256 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).  The Fifth Circuit held, perhaps correctly, that the policy’s con-
tinuous presence requirement is in conflict with the statutory guidance in 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(b)(1)(A), which requires continuous presence for ten years; thus, DHS exceeded 
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Second, the deferred action program is not an abdication of statu-
tory responsibilities.  The nonenforcement policy outlined in a mem-
orandum from Secretary Jeh Johnson requires deferred action to be 
used on a case-by-case basis; thus, it is not binding and an abdica-
tion.257  As held in Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan v. United States Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission, a nonenforcement policy is valid so long as 
it does not require mandatory compliance or restrict case-by-case dis-
cretion.258  In the immigration context, “real or perceived inadequate 
enforcement of immigration laws does not constitute a reviewable 
abdication of duty.”259  By requiring case-by-case determinations, the 
2014 deferred action program is more akin to a general statement of 
policy rather than a legislative rule since it does not mandate a find-
ing of eligibility in every instance;260 therefore, it is not an abdication 
despite being a categorical nonenforcement policy. 
The State plaintiffs challenging DHS argued, and the Fifth Circuit 
agreed, that the 2014 deferred action program was not an exercise of 
nonenforcement discretion but an affirmative agency action.261  Af-
firming the district court, the Fifth Circuit found that deferred action 
would affirmatively confer “lawful presence” status and associated 
benefits such as the ability to obtain Social Security numbers, work 
authorization permits, unemployment insurance, and driver’s licens-
es.262  Reminiscent of Adams v. Richardson, the Fifth Circuit held that 
by conferring eligibility for benefits the agency exercised its power 
such that it “can be reviewed to determine whether the agency ex-
 
the statutory guidance.  Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 180, cert. granted, 2016 WL 
207257 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-674). 
257 Memorandum from Jeh Johnson for Leon Rodriguez, Thomas S. Winkowski, R. Gil Ker-
likowske, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to 
the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Par-
ents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents at 3–4. 
258 866 F.2d 1473, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
259 Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 
U.S. 821, 834 (1985) (“The danger that agencies may not carry out their delegated pow-
ers with sufficient vigor does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that courts are the 
most appropriate body to policy this aspect of their performance.”). 
260 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson for Leon Rodriguez, Thomas S. Winkowski, R. 
Gil Kerlikowske, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who 
Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are 
the Parents of U.S.  Citizens or Permanent Residents at 2–4.  Judge King agreed with the 
DHS that the DAPA Memorandum still requires “discretionary judgments as to the appli-
cation of the respective criteria to the facts of a particular case.”  Texas v. United States, 
809 F.3d at 204 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., dissenting). 
261 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 at 169. 
262 Id. at 166.  In dissent, Judge King disagreed saying that “lawful presence” does not confer 
“legal status” and it is not a change in designation.  Id. at 199 (King, J., dissenting). 
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ceeded its statutory powers.”263  In Adams, the federal government 
provided funds to civil rights violators despite a statute prohibiting 
such action.264  The 2014 deferred action program is distinguishable 
from Adams because granting deferred action does not directly con-
vey any benefits or flout any statutes.  The Fifth Circuit erred by con-
flating two separate actions.  In the first action, DHS determines 
whether an individual is eligible for deferred action.  Once an indi-
vidual is granted deferred action, DHS can make a second decision to 
grant employment benefits pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3).265  
The benefits are incidental to deferred action and are authorized 
from specific provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  
Judge King made this exact point in her dissent in Texas v. United 
States.  The Immigration and Nationality Act and its associated regula-
tions grant the benefits, not the DAPA Memorandum.266  In effect, the 
majority’s interpretation would make any use of nonenforcement dis-
cretion subject to review if it triggered incidental benefits, which 
would swallow the Chaney doctrine.267  Deferred action does not grant 
any benefits—it just provides temporary relief from removal, making 
it the type of nonenforcement action encompassed by Chaney.268 
CONCLUSION 
Executive nonenforcement discretion is well-founded in case law, 
history, and text, but it remains controversial because it can encom-
pass sweeping executive power through selectivity in enforcement ac-
 
263 Id. at 168. 
264 Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
265 “As used in this section, the term ‘unauthorized alien’ means, with respect to the em-
ployment of an alien at a particular time, that the alien is not at that time either (A) an al-
ien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be so employed by 
this chapter or by the Attorney General.”  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3)(2015).  Prior to the en-
actment of this section in 1986, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) promul-
gated regulations allowing the Attorney General (now DHS) to grant employment au-
thorization to individuals granted deferred action.  8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14).  By 
enacting § 1324a(h)(3) and the amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) in 1986, Congress did not remove the Attorney General Authority.  The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawful-
ly Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. at 21, n.11 
(2014).  Thus, there is a grant of authority to the Executive in the INA allowing for de-
ferred action recipients to receive employment authorization. 
266 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 at 198 (King, J., dissenting) 
267 Id. at 201 (King, J., dissenting). 
268 If the State plaintiffs want to challenge the grant of benefits to illegal aliens then they 
should challenge § 274A(h)(3) of the INA and 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) as impermissi-
ble grants of legislative authority rather than challenge the Executive’s discretion to can-
cel removal under deferred action. 
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tions.  Prior to President Obama, nonenforcement discretion did not 
receive front-page attention on The New York Times in part because 
past decisions often involved non-politicized issues such as food and 
drug safety or nuclear regulation.  President George W. Bush’s use of 
nonenforcement discretion over environmental laws raised concerns 
among environmentalists but did not necessarily garner prominent 
national attention.269  President Obama’s decisions have been particu-
larly controversial because they addressed the most maligned accom-
plishment of his presidency (health care) and one of the biggest po-
litical issues in current American politics (immigration).  
Furthermore, even DHS and the Office of Legal Counsel recognized 
that the immigration decisions were likely the broadest use of execu-
tive nonenforcement discretion by a President.270 
Contrary to the arguments put forth by Price, the size of the non-
enforcement decision is not determinative.  The key question is 
whether the President has discretionary authority to enforce the law 
rather than mandatory requirements imposed by Congress.  This 
grants the President considerable discretion, but the text of the Con-
stitution and the understanding of the Framers supports this inter-
pretation.  The Framers did not intend to create an executive unable 
to resist and act independently of the legislature.  Furthermore, early 
practice by Presidents Washington and Jefferson supported robust 
presidential authority and influence over law enforcement. 
Such considerable presidential discretion is potentially troubling 
especially since the courts are unwilling to review nonenforcement 
discretion after Chaney, recognizing that such authority is an execu-
tive prerogative.  It is easy to see how a President could abuse his en-
forcement discretion to under-enforce important environmental or 
public health laws.271  However, the President’s actions are constitu-
tional as long as he avoids contradicting a statutory mandate.  If the 
President is acting within his discretion, the issue is a political dispute 
between the executive and legislative branches.  The Court in Chaney 
explicitly left such disputes for Congress to resolve.272  Madison envi-
 
269 Deacon, supra note 6, at 807–16 (reviewing examples of nonenforcement by President 
George W. Bush). 
270 The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Al-
iens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. 
O.L.C. at 30 (2014). 
271 See Deacon, supra note 8, at 796 (arguing that nonenforcement discretion has been used 
as a deregulation tool). 
272 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985) (“[W]e essentially leave to Congress, and 
not to the courts, the decision as to whether an agency’s refusal to institute proceedings 
should be judicially reviewable.”). 
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sioned a system of checks and balances.  President Obama has resort-
ed to nonenforcement discretion precisely because Congress has 
been unable to pass legislation and unwilling to check the concentra-
tion of power in the Executive.273  Executive nonenforcement discre-
tion is constitutional.  If Congress is concerned about executive dis-
cretion, then it should follow the instruction of Chaney and enact 
legislation rather than continuing the practice of abdicating power to 
the executive branch. 
 
273 See Deacon, supra note 8, at 805 (noting the political obstacles that make non-
enforcement appealing).  The 112th and 113th Congresses have been the least produc-
tive in terms of legislative productivity in history.  Drew DeSilver, In Late Spurt of Activity, 
Congress Avoids ‘Least Productive’ Title, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 29, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/29/in-late-spurt-of-activity-congress-
avoids-least-productive-title/.  The 113th Congress only enacted 296 laws compared to 
over 700 during the 1970s.  Bills by Final Status: Statistics and Historical Comparison, 
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Jan. 17, 
2015). 
